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ABSTRACT 
Intermediation in Innovation1 
by Heidrun C. Hoppe2 and Emre Ozdenoren3 
The paper offers a new theoretical framework to examine the role of intermediaries 
between creators and potential users of new inventions.  Using a model of university-
industry technology transfer, we demonstrate that technology transfer offices can 
provide an opportunity to economize on a critical component of efficient innovation 
investments: the expertise to locate new, external inventions and to overcome the 
problem of sorting ‘profitable’ from ‘unprofitable’ ones.  The findings may help explain 
the surge in university patenting and licensing since the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. 
Furthermore, the study identifies several limitations to the potential efficiency of 
intermediation in innovation. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Intermediation in Innovation 
In diesem Papier stellen wir ein neues theoretisches Modell zur Analyse der Rolle von 
Intermediären zwischen Erfindern und potentiellen Nutzern von Erfindungen vor. Für 
den Transfer von Erfindungen aus Universitäten in den Industriebereich zeigen wir, daß 
Technologietransfer-Stellen den Marktteilnehmern die Möglichkeit bieten, sich die 
Kosten für den Aufbau der Expertise, neue externe Erfindungen zu lokalisieren und 
evaluieren, zu teilen. Die Ergebnisse unserer Studie können dazu beitragen, die 
signifikante Zunahme der Universitätspatente und –lizensen seit dem Bayh-Dole-Act 
von 1980 in den USA zu erklären. Darüber hinaus diskutieren wir Wohlfahrtswirkungen 
der Aktivität von Innovations-Intermediären. 
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1 Introduction
One major constraint to the success of many invention-based ventures proves to be the
high degree of uncertainty about their pro…tability (Arrow, 1962; Kamien and Schwartz,
1982). Apart from technical di¢culties, it is often hard to assess the commercial value
of inventions that may lead to entirely new products without knowing the demand for
it. As a consequence, potential investors act on expected values, and pro…table new
technology may not be adopted due to pessimistic beliefs. In this paper, we examine the
role that intermediaries between creators, …nanciers, and users of new technology can play
in mitigating the problem of uncertainty.
Obviously, such intermediaries exist. Technology transfer o¢ces (TTOs) intermediate
between university researchers and industrial …rms. They assess the commercial poten-
tial of research results, such as the potential applications of an invention, its competitive
advantages, novelty and likely markets, and seek …rms that have the capability, inter-
est and resources to take on the development of the invention. Normally, they contact
several prospective licensees and pursue one of them. Finally, they negotiate a licensing
contract.1 Similarly, venture capitalists play a role as intermediaries between innovative
entrepreneurs and private investors, concentrating in industries where information gaps
between entrepreneurs and investors are commonplace. Their activity includes the eval-
uation of innovative ventures and the investment in selected start-up projects.2 Other
examples include underwriters who use their expertise and network of contacts to locate
investors with high valuations for the securities of a new start-up …rm, and technology-
based business incubators who intermediate between new start-up …rms, …nanciers, and
industrial customers.
Despite their obvious presence, such innovation intermediaries have received little at-
tention in the theoretical literature.3 In this paper, we o¤er a theoretical framework to
explore the conditions under which innovation intermediaries emerge and analyze the role
they can play in reducing the uncertainty problem in the process of new technology adop-
tion. We exemplify the issues in the context of university-industry technology transfer, and
present what is perhaps the simplest model that still captures the essence of the problem.
The model assumes that a potential market for invention fails to exist due to uncertainty
1See, e.g., Association of University Technology Managers Web Page, http://www.autm.net, and the
O¢ce of Technology Licensing Web Page, http://otl.stanford.edu/about/resources/history.html.
2For a comprehensive survey over the venture capital literature, see Gompers and Lerner (1999).
3There is growing, mainly empirical, literature on …nancial intermediation in the process of innovation
and new technology adoption (see, e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 1999). For a comprehensive survey over the
intermediation theory literature, see Spulber (1999).
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about the pro…tability of adoption. On the other hand, the bene…ts from adopting prof-
itable inventions are, if realized, in aggregate large enough to compensate an agent, called
the intermediary, for acquiring the ability to locate new inventions, identify those that are
pro…table, and recommend them to potential investors. However, because of asymmetric
information the intermediary might claim a high quality even when the invention is of
low quality. Moreover, the intermediary may have an incentive to do so whenever it does
not bear the cost of adopting the invention. As a consequence, investors’ payments to the
intermediary may not be large enough to recoup the cost of acquiring the expertise in the
…rst place, making active intermediation in innovation impossible. The model admits two
types of equilibria under certain conditions: innovation equilibria in which an intermediary
invests in expertise, evaluates inventions, and matches the pro…table ones with potential
investors, and equilibria in which no innovation occurs.
The central insight of the analysis can be described as follows: Innovation interme-
diaries provide an opportunity for potential users and …nanciers of new inventions to
economize on a critical component of innovation decisions under uncertainty: the exper-
tise to locate new, external inventions and to overcome the problem of sorting ‘pro…table’
from ‘unpro…table’ ones. As noted by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), acquiring this exper-
tise involves considerable sunk costs. Thus, potential investors may bene…t from sharing
expertise. We …nd that an intermediary may be able to exploit economies of sharing
expertise.
The analysis reveals that the extent to which economies of sharing are realized depends
critically on two factors. First, the possibility to use success-based payments, and second,
the number of available inventions. If the payo¤ for the intermediary can be tied to the
investors’ payo¤, e.g., by running royalties, we show that the intermediary will select as
many pro…table inventions as possible (i.e., employ a “non-wasteful” selection strategy).
Because this strategy increases the probability that an investor will obtain a high return to
investment, the usage of success-based payments tends to increase investors’ valuation of
the intermediation service. Nevertheless, simply tying the intermediary’s payo¤ to that of
the investor is not su¢cient to ensure that the intermediary’s revenue will be large enough
to recoup the cost of expertise. In addition, a critical mass must be reached on the input
side. We show that an increase in the size of the invention pool can increase investors’
willingness to pay for intermediation activity. However, as it turns out, this relationship
need not necessarily be monotonic. The reason is a multiplicity of consistent equilibrium
selection strategies, thus leading to multiple equilibria in the innovation subgames. Never-
theless, we demonstrate that intermediation in innovation can become viable, considering
all costs, if the number of inventions is above some threshold level. The …ndings in our
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model are consistent with empirical evidence.
Furthermore, we analyze welfare properties of the innovation equilibria. While in-
termediation helps reducing the uncertainty problem, social e¢ciency may be limited by
the intermediary’s incentive to o¤er inventions of low pro…tability whenever there are no
pro…table inventions available, and by the high potential for coordination failure due to
the multiplicity of equilibria. Social ine¢ciencies may also arise from competition among
multiple intermediaries. We …nd that combining intermediation services, e.g. in regional
networks, may be a way to improve social welfare.
The work most closely related in the intermediation literature appears to be that of
Biglaiser (1993) and Lizzeri (1999). Both authors examine models where sellers and buy-
ers are asymmetrically informed about the quality of a product. Biglaiser shows that the
concern for reputation may induce an in…nitely lived middleman who buys and resells
goods to inspect the quality and signal it through his choice of price.4 Lizzeri investigates
the extent to which quality can be signalled by means of a certi…cation agency, taking into
account that the agency may bene…t from information manipulation. In both papers, the
intermediary serves as a device for signalling high quality, but plays no active role other-
wise. In contrast, we focus on a situation where initially no party has private information,
so signalling of information is no issue in our paper. Instead, we analyze the incentives
of an intermediary to invest in expertise and make proper use of it. Caillaud and Jullien
(2001) analyze a model with intermediaries who are able to match suitable trading part-
ners. Competition in registration and transaction fees is shown to give rise to dominant
…rm equilibria that are similar to the equilibria with concentrated intermediation in our
model. However, in contrast to our paper, an intermediary is endowed with expertise by
assumption which makes truthful matching always credible in their model.
Related is also the work on venture capitalists by Chan (1983). He too considers
a model where potential investors must decide whether or not to invest in an innovative
venture. His focus, however, is di¤erent from ours. We focus on the problem of uncertainty
about the characteristics of a new invention and the corresponding question of whether an
intermediary can reduce this uncertainty, whereas Chan does not address the uncertainty
problem but instead focuses on the moral hazard problem with inventor e¤ort and the
corresponding question of whether an intermediary can induce inventors to expend more
e¤ort.5
4The analysis is extended in Biglaiser and Friedman (1999) by allowing for free-entry competition
between intermediaries.
5For a recent study of the role of intermediaries in mitigating moral hazard and opportunism, see Dixit
(2001).
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In the innovation literature, the paper closest to ours seems to be that of Jensen and
Thursby (2001). They too consider a theoretical model of university-industry technol-
ogy transfer.6 Their model assumes that there is a single new invention and a single
potential adopter and that a TTO is responsible for executing the technology transfer.
Their central …nding is that royalty licensing can alleviate a moral hazard problem with
inventor e¤ort. By contrast, we consider a situation with multiple inventions and multiple
investors and explore the reasons why intermediaries such as TTOs emerge. Our paper
hence complements their work.
In the next section we develop the formal intermediation model. Section 3 presents the
equilibrium analysis. In Section 4 we consider competition between intermediaries. Section
5 endogenizes the inventor involvement in the process of new technology adoption. Section
6 concludes with a discussion of empirical evidence, policy implications, and directions for
future research.
2 Model
In the following we will exemplify the issue of intermediation in innovation in the context
of a university-industry technology transfer model. Intermediation by venture capitalists,
underwriters, and technology-based incubators could be modeled along similar lines. An
analysis of these innovation intermediaries is discussed in Section 6.
Consider a situation with a …nite set of inventors N ´ f1; ::::; ng ; each of which has
one invention, and a …nite set of …rms, K ´ f1; ::::; kg : Without loss of generality we
can assume that k · n (i.e. there are at least as many inventions as there are …rms).
Inventors need an investor for the commercialization of their invention, while …rms seek
to commercialize one promising new invention.7 The cost of commercializing an invention
is A > 0. Each …rm j 2 K is characterized by an e¢ciency parameter ¯j > 0; with
¯1 ¸ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¸ ¯k: All parties are risk-neutral.
One of the key features of new inventions is that their return to adoption is uncertain.
To capture this feature, let q denote the quality of an invention and assume that the
adoption return is q = VH with probability p; and q = VL with probability (1¡ p), where
6For empirical studies of technology transfer from universities and federal laboratories to industry, see
Ja¤e (1989), Audretsch and Stephan (1996), Henderson et al. (1998), Zucker et al. (1998), Ja¤e and
Lerner (1999), Siegel et al. (2000), Mowery and Ziedonis (2001).
7That is, we assume that each potential investor has …nancial funds for one innovation. An alternative
interpretation is that, even if a …rm can invest in more than one invention, k represents the total number
of innovation opportunities.
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0 < p < 1 and 0 < VL < VH :8 Firms are unable to observe the quality level of an invention
before they make the investment. If …rm j adopts an invention of quality qi; it obtains a
return ¯jqi.
9 We make the following two assumptions:
¯1 [pVH + (1¡ p)VL] < A (A1)
¯kVH > A (A2)
Assumption A1 implies that even the most e¢cient …rm would not adopt an invention of
unknown quality. Assumption A2 implies that even the least e¢cient …rm would adopt a
high-quality invention when there is no uncertainty. Under these assumptions a potential
market for invention fails to exist due to uncertainty about the pro…tability of adoption.
Now we introduce an intermediary, called the technology transfer o¢ce (TTO). We as-
sume that the TTO is also risk neutral. The TTO can choose to make a sunk investment
of C > 0 to acquire an expertise that enables it to locate a new invention and recognize
whether it is of high or low quality. C can for instance be interpreted as the cost of human
capital development or the cost of hiring personnel with professional competence in spe-
cialized …elds. For simplicity, we neglect any variable costs of evaluating inventions, which
seems fairly in accordance with empirical observations. As noted for instance by Cohen
and Levinthal (1989, 1990), the cost of acquiring the ability to assess the value of new,
external knowledge is typically substantial compared to immediate costs of information
processing, which are often negligible.10
We are interested in a situation where the inventions are owned by a university and
the university’s TTO is responsible for executing the technology transfer to …rms. In
Section 4 we extend the basic model by allowing for multiple TTOs. The participation of
faculty-inventors in university-industry technology transfer is considered in Section 5.
8The assumption that there are only two types of inventions is made to simplify the analysis. One can
verify that the results of the paper continue to hold in the case of more than two types.
9Notice that we capture the e¢ciency of a …rm through the value that the …rm can create by adopting
any invention. E¢ciency on the other hand can also be captured through lower cost of developing and
implementing an invention. In other words, we could have multiplied the adoption cost A with a …rm-
speci…c e¢ciency parameter. Our results continue to hold in such a case.
10We can verify that the results obtained in this paper continue to hold when there is a small cost of
expertise per invention. Furthermore, the results also hold if the investment in expertise would enable the
intermediary to obtain only a noisy (but informative) signal about the commercial value of new inventions,
or if …rms have some a priori information about the pro…tability of adopting an invention. The critical
point is that, even if …rms possess some information, the intermediary can choose to get better informed
by making the investment C > 0:
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The timing and nature of decisions by the TTO and …rms are as follows. At date 0,
the TTO decides whether to invest in expertise or not. The investment is observable. If it
does not invest, the game ends and payo¤s to all players are zero. If it invests, it observes
the number of high-quality inventions that are available, denoted by m; where m · n: At
date 1, the TTO and …rms play the following innovation game. The strategy for the TTO
is a selection rule, denoted by ¾: The TTO o¤ers each …rm j 2 K an invention according
to its selection rule ¾; and charges a fraction ½j of the expected revenue accruing to the
…rm once it adopts the new technology, where ½j 2 (0; 1] :11 Formally, let ¾ = fsjgj2K be
a set of functions, where sj : f1; ::::; ng ! f0; 1g for each j 2 K: Here sj (m) = 1 means
that …rm j 2 K receives a high-quality invention, and sj (m) = 0 means that …rm j 2 K
receives a low-quality invention, when there are m high-quality inventions. We assume
that
Pk
j=1 sj (m) · m and k¡
Pk
j=1 sj (m) · n¡m. At date 2, each …rm accepts or rejects
the TTO’s o¤er. Each …rm has a belief about the TTO’s selection choice. We denote the
set of …rms that participate in technology transfer by P; and the cardinality of P by #P:
A participating …rm invests A to implement the invention, and payo¤s are realized.
Let ¼j denote the probability that …rm j 2 P will receive a high-quality invention,
given sj . That is,
¼j (sj) =
nX
m=1
sj (m)¸ (m) ;
where
¸ (m) =
Ã
n
m
!
pm (1¡ p)n¡m
Let ~¼j be …rm j’s belief that it will obtain a high-quality invention, and ~P µ K denote
the subset of …rms that the TTO believes will participate in technology transfer. The
expected payo¤ of a …rm j 2 K; from participation is then³
1¡ ½j
´
¯j [~¼jVH + (1¡ ~¼j)VL]¡A; (1)
and the expected payo¤ of the TTO isX
j2 ~P
½j¯j [¼jVH + (1¡ ¼j)VL]¡C (2)
11Note that the model covers the two most frequently used licensing methods for university inventions,
royalty (fee per unit of output) and equity contracts (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Jensen et al., 2001).
For simplicity we neglect the possible output distortion induced by royalties through their e¤ect on the
marginal cost of production.
6
if it invests in expertise. We assume that …rm j is willing to participate in technology
transfer whenever its expected payo¤ from adoption, as given by (1), is nonnegative.
Similarly, the TTO is willing to invest in expertise whenever its expected payo¤ from such
an investment, as given by (2), is nonnegative. So, a necessary condition for intermediation
activity is
kX
j=1
¯jVH ¡ kA > C (A3)
which states that the cost of expertise is smaller than the maximal social gains from
technology transfer. We assume that A3 holds.
3 Intermediation equilibria
In the absence of an intermediary, …rms have no incentive to adopt an invention in the sit-
uation characterized by assumptions A1 and A2 due to uncertainty about the pro…tability
of adoption. The key question is whether this uncertainty can be credibly resolved through
intermediation activity. We are interested in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the over-
all game where equilibrium strategies constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in every
subgame. In the following we will show that intermediation equilibria with innovation
may indeed exist under assumptions A1 through A3. Working backwards, we start with
the examination of the innovation game at date 1.
3.1 Non-wasteful equilibrium
We …rst characterize the intermediary’s equilibrium selection strategy in the continuation
game after its investment in expertise. For this we make use of the following de…nition:
De…nition 1 Suppose P is the set of …rms that participate in technology transfer in an
equilibrium of the innovation game. A non-wasteful equilibrium is an equilibrium in whichP
j2P sj (m) = min fm;#Pg :
In a non-wasteful equilibrium each high-quality invention is assigned to some partic-
ipating …rm, as long as there are fewer high-quality inventions than …rms. In the case
where there are more high-quality inventions than participating …rms, all …rms receive a
high-quality invention.
Proposition 1 Suppose the TTO invests in expertise, then all Bayesian Nash equilibria
of the innovation game in which at least one …rm participates are non-wasteful.
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Proof. Suppose in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game the set of …rms that partic-
ipate is given by P; with P 6= ;.
Case (i): 0 < m · #P: Suppose towards a contradiction that Pj2P sj (m) < m: Since
P 6= ;; this implies that there exists some j0 2 P such that sj0 (m) = 0. Consider the
following deviation by the TTO: s^j0 (m) = 1: Clearly such a deviation is feasible. The
probability that …rm j0 will receive a high-quality invention, given the deviation, is
¼^j0 =
X
l 6=m
sj0 (l)¸ (l) + s^j0 (m)¸ (m)
=
X
l 6=m
sj0 (l)¸ (l) + ¸ (m)
Now, for any selection of contracts
n
½j
o
K
, we have ¼^j0 > ¼j0 which implies that
½j0¯j0
£
¼^j0VH +
¡
1¡ ¼^j0
¢
VL
¤
> ½j0¯j0
£
¼j0VH +
¡
1¡ ¼j0
¢
VL
¤
for all ½j0 2 (0; 1] : Clearly, the TTO’s payo¤ increases, which is a contradiction. Hence,P
j2P sj (m) = m:
Case (ii): m > #P: A similar line of arguments establishes that
P
j2P sj (m) = #P .
Proposition 1 reveals that an intermediary who has invested in expertise always bene…ts
from choosing a non-wasteful selection strategy, given it believes that at least one investor
will participate in the innovation game. This result highlights the crucial role of success-
based compensation for intermediation in innovation: because the intermediary gains when
a commercialized invention yields a high return, it has an incentive to select as many
high-quality inventions as possible. By contrast, it would have no such incentive under a
…xed-fee payment scheme. This implies that even though the intermediary has no means
to credibly reveal the true nature of an invention, potential investors can infer from the
usage of success-based payments that selecting inventions of high commercial value is a
priority for the intermediary. The …nding can account for the frequent usage of success-
based licensing methods such as royalty (fee per unit of output) and equity contracts in
university-industry technology transfer (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Jensen et al., 2001).12
The next lemma states an important property of a non-wasteful equilibrium when the
number of inventions tends to in…nity.
12Fixed fees in university-industry licensing contracts are mainly used to cover the …xed costs of patent
applications. As Jensen and Thursby (2001) have shown the usage of …xed fees can also be explained by
the presence of risk aversion.
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Lemma 1 Suppose P µ K is the set of …rms that participate in a non-wasteful equilibrium
of the innovation game, then limn!1 ¼j = 1 for all j 2 P , P µ K:
Proof. Note that,
¼j (sj) =
nX
m=1
sj (m)¸ (m)
=
X
1·m<k
sj (m)¸ (m) +
X
k·m·n
sj (m)¸ (m) :
In a non-wasteful equilibrium,
P
m¸k sj (m)¸ (m) =
P
m¸k ¸ (m) : Thus,
¼j (sj) ¸
X
k·m·n
¸ (m)! 1 as n!1:
Thus, when the number of inventions gets large enough, the probability that a licensee-
…rm obtains a high return approaches 1 in any equilibrium of the innovation game in which
at least one …rm participates. In contrast, note that under a …xed-fee payment scheme
the probability that a licensee-…rm obtains a high return would not approach 1 in every
equilibrium in which at least one …rm participates when the number of inventions goes to
in…nity. Note further that in the absence of an intermediary the probability of obtaining
a high return always remains p, irrespective of any variation in the size of the invention
pool.
The lemma is now used to prove our …rst main result.
Proposition 2 If n is large enough, there are two types of subgame-perfect equilibria.
One involves investment in expertise by the TTO and participation of all …rms. The other
involves no investment in expertise by the TTO and no participation of any …rm.
Proof. Consider …rst the continuation game where the TTO has invested in expertise.
Suppose there is one …rm that participates. So we know by Proposition 1 that in this case
the TTO will choose a strategy ¾ so that the equilibrium will be non-wasteful. We now
show that in this case in fact all …rms participate when n is large enough.
Let
n
½
0
j
o
K
be the set of contracts such that³
1¡ ½0j
´
¯j [~¼jVH + (1¡ ~¼j)VL]¡A = 0 (3)
for all j 2 K: We show that
n
½
0
j
o
K
exists if n is large enough. Let ¯kVH ¡ A = ¢: By
assumption A2, ¢ > 0 is such that the least e¢cient …rm will participate if it obtains a
9
high-quality technology for sure. Choose n^ large enough such that
¯k
0@ X
k·m·n^
¸ (m)
1AVH + ¯k
0@1¡ X
k·m·n^
¸ (m)
1AVL ¡A > ¢
2
> 0:
Note that ~¼j (sj) ¸ Pk·m·n^ sj (m)¸ (m) : In a non-wasteful equilibrium, we have thatP
k·m·n^ sj (m)¸ (m) =
P
k·m·n^ ¸ (m) : So ~¼j (sj) ¸
P
k·m·n^ ¸ (m) : This means that
¯j~¼j (sj)VH + ¯j (1¡ ~¼j (sj))VL ¡A
¸ ¯k
0@ X
k·m·n^
¸ (m)
1AVH + ¯k
0@1¡ X
k·m·n^
¸ (m)
1AVL ¡A
>
¢
2
> 0
since ¯j ¸ ¯k for any j 2 P; P µ K: Thus, ½0j can be chosen small enough such that³
1¡ ½0j
´
¯j [~¼j (sj)VH + (1¡ ~¼j (sj))VL]¡A ¸ 0 (4)
Hence, if n is large enough, there is a contract ½0j such that condition (4) is satis…ed for …rm
j, and since j is arbitrary,
n
½
0
j
o
K
exists. That is, if o¤ered ½
0
j, each …rm j 2 K participates.
It is easy to check that for n large enough
n
½
0
j
o
K
is indeed part of every subgame-perfect
equilibria in which the TTO invests in expertise. This follows from Proposition 1 and
since the TTO’s expected payo¤ is increasing in ½j and #P:
To complete this part of the proof we show that the TTO …nds it optimal to invest
in expertise if n is large enough, provided that P 6= ;; i.e. it expects at least one …rm to
participate in the continuation game. From Lemma 1, n can be chosen large enough such
that for any " 2 [0; 1] ;
¯j [¼jVH + (1¡ ¼j)VL] ¸ (1¡ ")¯jVH (5)
Hence,
kX
j=1
¯j [¼jVH + (1¡ ¼j)VL] ¸ (1¡ ")
kX
j=1
¯jVH (6)
We can write the TTO’s revenue as
kX
j=1
¯j [¼jVH + (1¡ ¼j)VL]¡
kX
j=1
³
1¡ ½0j
´
¯j [¼jVH + (1¡ ¼j)VL]
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=
kX
j=1
¯j [¼jVH + (1¡ ¼j)VL]¡
kX
j=1
³
1¡ ½0j
´
¯j [~¼jVH + (1¡ ~¼j)VL]
=
kX
j=1
¯j [¼jVH + (1¡ ¼j)VL]¡ kA
¸ (1¡ ")
kX
j=1
¯jVH ¡ kA
where the …rst equality follows from ~¼j = ¼j in a non-wasteful equilibrium, the second
equality follows from the assumption that the …rms will participate whenever their ex-
pected payo¤ is non-negative and the third (weak) inequality from (6). Furthermore, for
any C that satis…es assumption A3 we can choose " small enough such that
(1¡ ")
kX
j=1
¯jVH ¡ kA > C
is satis…ed. Consequently, the TTO chooses to invest in expertise.
Now reconsider the subgame that follows the investment in expertise by the TTO. We
will construct a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the continuation game in which no …rm
participates. One such equilibrium would be the one where the TTO chooses to o¤er only
available low-quality inventions, together with any set of licensing contracts. Since n is
large enough by hypothesis, in this case all …rms would receive a low-quality invention
with high probability. If …rms have compatible beliefs, i.e. they assign probability 0 to
the TTO playing a strategy ¾ such that the equilibrium will be non-wasteful, they prefer
not to participate. Thus, given this equilibrium of the subgame, the TTO chooses not to
invest in expertise in the …rst place.
This completes the proof, since we have shown that, if n is large enough, in any
subgame-perfect equilibrium either all …rms participate and the TTO invests in expertise,
or no …rm participates and the TTO does not invest in expertise.
Proposition 2 reveals that the feasibility of success-based payments, while necessary, is
not su¢cient to guarantee e¤ective intermediation activity. Required is also a critical mass
on the input side. As we demonstrate, a larger pool of commercializable technologies can
make the probability that unpro…table inventions are selected small in any non-wasteful
equilibrium. An increase in the pool size thus tends to enhance potential investors’ will-
ingness to participate in the innovation game. However, as the proof of Proposition 2 also
reveals, this relationship need not be necessarily monotonic. The reason is the multiplicity
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of consistent equilibrium selection strategy beliefs, leading to multiple non-wasteful equi-
libria in the innovation game. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that the expected revenue for
the TTO will be large enough to recoup the cost of expertise if the number of inventions
exceeds a threshold level, and intermediation in innovation becomes viable.
The intuition behind the result is that intermediaries can provide an opportunity for
investors to collectively share the expertise that is needed to overcome the problem of
locating new technologies and sorting pro…table from unpro…table ones.13 If the number
of inventions is large enough, it pays for an intermediary to invest in expertise and reduce
the uncertainty problems surrounding the adoption of new technology in the economy.
Technology transfer then occurs in a situation where no transfer would occur without an
intermediary.
Note however that social e¢ciency in the market for inventions may still be limited
by the intermediary’s incentive to recommend inventions of low pro…tability whenever it
does not bear the cost of adopting the inventions. Note further that the innovation game
admits equilibria in which more e¢cient …rms invest in unpro…table inventions while less
e¢cient …rms invest in pro…table ones. In addition, ine¢ciencies may result if coordination
between …rms and the intermediary as envisioned in the innovation equilibria does not
occur. As the proposition shows, there always exists an equilibrium in which neither the
intermediary nor potential investors are active. This equilibrium arises when potential
investors assign probability 0 to the intermediary employing a non-wasteful strategy, and
the intermediary expects the set of participating investors to be empty. Fortunately, the
equilibrium without innovation appears to be rather fragile. It can be shown that for n
large enough every sequential equilibrium involves investment in expertise by the TTO
and participation by all …rms.
3.2 E¢cient equilibrium
In the following we will identify a particular equilibrium in which the gains from innovation
are maximized.
De…nition 2 The e¢cient strategy is a strategy ¾ such that sj (t) = 1 for all j · t: The
e¢cient equilibrium is the equilibrium in which the TTO uses the e¢cient strategy.
In the e¢cient equilibrium each high-quality invention is assigned to the most e¢cient
…rms as long as there are fewer high-quality inventions than …rms. In the case where there
13Kranton and Minehart (2001) identify economies of sharing in a di¤erent context. They show that
buyer-seller networks can exploit economies of sharing productive capacity of sellers.
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are more high quality inventions than …rms, all …rms receive a high-quality invention.
Non-wasteful equilibrium allows us to characterize the participation decision of …rms
only when the TTO has access to a large invention pool. Apart from being intuitively plau-
sible, e¢cient equilibrium also allows us to characterize the participation decision of …rms
when the invention pool is not very large. To be speci…c, de…ne ® by ¯1 [®VH + (1¡ ®)VL] =
A: Now let n^ be the smallest integer such that
® ·
n^X
m=1
Ã
n^
m
!
pm (1¡ p)n^¡m :
Thus n^ is the minimum number of inventions that would make it pro…table for the most
e¢cient …rm to participate when it for sure gets a high-quality invention if there is one. If
the invention pool is smaller than this, it can not be pro…table for any …rm to participate.
The next proposition establishes the existence of a unique (up to relabelling of non-
participating …rms) e¢cient equilibrium, and provides a characterization of …rm partici-
pation in technology transfer.
Proposition 3 Suppose n ¸ n^: There exists a unique e¢cient equilibrium with k^ · k
such that all …rms j · k^ license an invention if the TTO invests in expertise. Moreover,
the TTO invests in expertise if
k^X
j=1
¯j [¼^jVH + (1¡ ¼^j)VL]¡ k^A ¸ C (7)
where
¼^j =
nX
m=j
Ã
n
m
!
pm (1¡ p)n¡m (8)
is the probability that each licensee-…rm receives a high-quality invention in the e¢cient
equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that the TTO is using an e¢cient strategy, and whenever there is a
positive expected surplus, o¤ering contracts that give zero expected pro…ts to …rms if
they participate. Otherwise the TTO o¤ers any contract, and all such contracts give a
negative expected payo¤ to the relevant …rm. By de…nition of n^ the most e¢cient …rm
has a positive expected surplus and under the preceding strategy it clearly participates if
the TTO invests in expertise and uses an e¢cient strategy. Therefore the equilibrium set
of participating …rms is P 6= ;: Now suppose towards a contradiction that there are …rms
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k1 < k2 · k such that k1 =2 P but k2 2 P: The expected surplus for k1 is positive since the
expected surplus for k2 is non-negative under the strategy of TTO. Thus …rm k1 also …nds
it pro…table to participate, contradiction. It is easy to see that the TTO can not bene…t
from deviating from the e¢cient strategy once it invests in expertise. This establishes the
…rst claim. The second claim follows immediately from the …rst one.
The e¢cient equilibrium, if it exists, weakly Pareto-dominates all other equilibria in the
sense that no …rm is worse o¤ and the TTO is strictly better o¤. The e¢cient equilibrium
may therefore be regarded as a focal point in the game on which …rms and TTO coordinate.
Clearly, if the license revenue obtainable for the TTO is not large enough to recoup the
cost of expertise, any equilibrium with technology transfer will fail to exist.
For the e¢cient equilibrium it is now shown that an increase in the number of inventions
monotonically increases the number of licenses and hence the license revenue obtainable
for the TTO. The reason is that, under the e¢cient selection strategy, the probability that
the TTO selects a high-quality invention for any given …rm is monotonically increasing in
the size of its invention pool.
Proposition 4 In the e¢cient equilibrium, the number of licenses k^ is a monotone in-
creasing function in the number of inventions n:
Proof. In an e¢cient equilibrium, we have
¼j (n) =
nX
l=j
Ã
n
l
!
pl(1¡ p)n¡l
which is a monotone increasing function in n: To see this note thatÃ
n+ 1
l
!
=
Ã
n
l
!
+
Ã
n
l ¡ 1
!
for l · n: Using this equality we can see that,
¼j (n+ 1)¡ ¼j (n) =
Ã
n
j ¡ 1
!
pj(1¡ p)n¡j+1 > 0:
The result follows immediately.
The evidence given in Siegel et al. (2000) appears to be consistent with the e¢cient
equilibrium. Using a database of 113 U.S. universities, Siegel et al. …nd that the number
of disclosed inventions has a positive e¤ect on both the number of licenses as well as the
TTO’s license revenue.
14
An attractive feature of the e¢cient equilibrium is that it maximizes not only the
licensing revenue for the TTO but also the number of licenses. Note that in the e¢cient
equilibrium a …rm participates only when positive surplus is generated from its partici-
pation, given that all …rms that are more e¢cient are participating. Therefore there is
no other allocation that would achieve a greater number of licenses. In this sense, even
when the TTO’s main objective is maximizing the number of licenses, it could not do
better than what it achieves in the e¢cient equilibrium. Thus committing to maximizing
revenues and playing the e¢cient equilibrium achieves multiple objectives for the TTO.14
Since licensing revenues are maximized, this income may be used for further research, and
this is done in a way that the number of licences is maximized.
4 Competition between intermediaries
In this section we consider a situation with multiple intermediaries. One might expect com-
petition to lead to lower gains from intermediation and hence a lower volume of innovation
investments. While a complete analysis of the e¤ects of competition between intermedi-
aries is beyond the scope of the present paper, a simple extension of our university-industry
technology transfer framework suggests that this need not be the case. Rather, the in-
novation investments as envisioned in the e¢cient equilibrium (Proposition 3) is always
an equilibrium outcome in the case of multiple intermediaries. However, we will show
that competition between intermediaries may also be a source of ine¢cient innovation
investments.
Suppose there are two universities, i = 1; 2; each with its own TTO, TTO 1 and TTO
2, respectively. The sequence of decisions is like that of the model in Section 2. At date
0, the TTOs simultaneously decide whether to invest in expertise or not. The investment
is observable. If neither of them invests, the game is over and payo¤s to all players are
zero. If TTO i invests, it observes the number of high-quality inventions, denoted by
mi; that are available in its invention pool ni, where mi · ni: At date 1, the TTOs and
…rms play the following game. The strategy for TTO i is a selection rule, denoted by ¾i.
Each TTO i o¤ers each …rm j 2 K an invention according to its selection rule ¾i; and
charges a royalty rate ½ij 2 (0; 1] for the license. Formally, let ¾i = fsjgj2K be a set of
14The recent survey of major U.S. universities by Jensen et al. (2000) reveals that the most important
objective to a TTO is the generation of licensing revenue. 71% of the respondents (either directors or
license o¢cers of the TTOs) said that it is extremely important, and only one respondent indicated that
it is not important. The second most important objective is the number of inventions commercialized,
followed closely by the number of licenses.
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functions, where sj : f1; ::::; nig ! f0; 1g for each j 2 K: Here sj (mi) = 1 means that
…rm j receives a high-quality invention from TTO i, and sj (mi) = 0 means that …rm j
receives a low-quality invention from TTO i; when there are mi high-quality inventions.
We assume that
Pk
j=1 sj (mi) · mi; and k¡
Pk
j=1 sj (mi) · ni¡mi. At date 2, each …rm
accepts at most one license o¤er (or rejects both o¤ers). Each …rm has a belief about the
TTOs selection rules. We denote the cardinality of each set of participating licensee-…rms
Pi by #Pi: A participating …rm invests A to implement the new technology, and payo¤s
are realized.
Let ¼ij be the probability that …rm j 2 Pi will receive a high-quality invention from
TTO i, given sj, and let ~¼ij be …rm j’s belief about this probability. The expected payo¤
of a …rm j 2 Pi is ³
1¡ ½ij
´
¯j
h
~¼ijVH +
³
1¡ ~¼ij
´
VL
i
¡A: (9)
Let ~Pi ½ K denote the subset of …rms that TTO i believes would license one of its
inventions. The expected payo¤ of TTO i is thenX
j2 ~Pi
½ij¯j
h
¼ijVH +
³
1¡ ¼ij
´
VL
i
¡C (10)
if it invests in expertise.
Just like in the model in Section 2, the game of competing intermediaries has multiple
subgame-perfect equilibria due to the large strategy space of the TTOs. In the following
we restrict attention to situations in which the TTOs are constrained to employ only
certain kinds of selection strategies:
1. E¢cient equilibria, in which the TTOs commit to the e¢cient selection strategy,
and …rms’ beliefs are compatible with these strategies.
2. Specialization equilibria, in which the TTOs commit to license as many high-quality
inventions as possible to …rms of a certain type, and …rms’ beliefs are compatible
with these strategies.
4.1 E¢cient equilibria with multiple intermediaries
Proposition 3 showed that in the case of a monopoly TTO there exists a unique equilibrium
where intermediation implements e¢ciency in technology transfer. In this section we
demonstrate that the equilibrium identi…ed in Proposition 3 remains an equilibrium when
there is competition among TTOs. Competition may however also give rise to another,
less e¢cient equilibrium.
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Suppose that each TTO, i = 1; 2; commits to the e¢cient strategy ¾i, and suppose
…rms’ beliefs are compatible with this selection rule. Let n be the in…mum of the number
of inventions available to a TTO such that all …rms are guaranteed to participate in the
e¢cient equilibrium of the monopoly game. Such n exists by Proposition 4. We are
interested in the e¤ect of competition in situations where ni ¸ n for at least one TTO.
First we consider the case where universities are symmetric with respect to their invention
pools, and then proceed to analyze the case of asymmetric invention pools.
Suppose that n1 = n2 ¸ n: Thus if both TTOs invest in expertise, …rm j; faced with a
contract o¤er from each TTO, expects to get a high-quality invention from each of them
with the same probability. Hence, …rm j’s best response is to contract with TTO i if³
1¡ ½ij
´
¯j
h
~¼ijVH +
³
1¡ ~¼ij
´
VL
i
¡A ¸ 0 and ½ij < ½¡ij
where ½¡ij is the royalty rate o¤ered by the other TTO, denoted by TTO ¡i: That is, each
…rm prefers a licensing contract with a lower royalty rate to one with a higher royalty
rate.15 Faced with the same expected quality/royalty o¤er, we assume that the …rm
contracts with TTO i with probability 1=2 and with TTO ¡i with probability 1=2: The
next proposition characterizes the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the overall
game when n1 = n2 ¸ n:
Proposition 5 Suppose n1 = n2 ¸ n. There exists no subgame-perfect e¢cient equilib-
rium in which both TTOs engage in technology transfer. There exists a subgame-perfect
e¢cient equilibrium in which only one TTO invests in expertise and all …rms participate
if C is not too high.
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that there exists a subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibrium
in which both TTOs invest in expertise. Consider the associated continuation game, in
which each TTO chooses a royalty rate, ½ij; for each …rm j 2 K. A necessary condition
for the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this subgame is ½1j = ½
2
j = 0 for all
j 2 K; for otherwise, one TTO could raise its payo¤ by slightly undercutting the rival’s
o¤er. That is, the TTOs face Bertrand competition with respect to each single …rm j.
Clearly, the licensing revenue obtainable from each …rm j and hence the total revenue for
15This subsection thus considers the extreme case where inventions from di¤erent universities are treated
as perfect substitutes. This is of course not always true, but it is likely to be valid whenever there exist
alternative techniques for the same purpose, e.g. alternative ways to test a drug, and whenever …rms are
not too specialized on certain technology …elds before adoption. We deal with specialization equilibria in
the next subsection.
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each TTO i is zero. Thus, given one TTO invests in expertise in the …rst stage, investment
is never pro…table for the other TTO. This contradiction establishes the …rst claim of the
proposition. From this, Propositions 3 and the fact that n1 = n2 ¸ n, the second claim
follows immediately.
The proposition implies that investment by both intermediaries cannot be supported
as a subgame-perfect equilibrium despite the initial symmetry of the game. The intuition
is the following. In the equilibrium of the technology transfer game that follows the
investment by both TTOs, each …rm contracts with the TTO that o¤ers the lowest royalty
rate. Hence the TTOs engage in a bidding contest with respect to each single …rm. As a
result the …rm obtains the entire surplus. There is hence no way for a TTO to recoup the
investment costs. On the other hand, as shown in the previous section, intermediation is
clearly attractive for a single TTO as long as the other one remains inactive. The result
reveals that a TTO’s incentive to invest in expertise depends crucially on the rival TTO’s
investment choice.
Suppose next that n2 < n · n1. That is, only TTO 1 can ensure participation of all
…rms should the rival TTO remain inactive.
Proposition 6 Suppose n2 < n · n1. There exists a unique n0 with n0 < n if C is not
too high such that:
(i) For n2 < n0 · n, there exists a unique subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibrium. It
involves investment in expertise only by TTO 1 and participation by all …rms.
(ii) For n0 · n2 < n, there exist two subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibria: one in which
only TTO 1 invests and all …rms participate, and another in which only TTO 2
invests and some but not all …rms participate. There exist no other subgame-perfect
e¢cient equilibria.
Proof. Suppose that TTO 2 has invested in expertise. Also suppose that n2 < n: By
Proposition 4, the number of participating …rms is a monotone increasing function in n2
in the e¢cient equilibrium of the technology transfer game. This means that there must
be a unique n2; say n0; where n0 < n; such that the available surplus obtainable for TTO
1 from investing in expertise and competing with TTO 2 in a Bertrand fashion is large
enough to recoup TTO 1’s cost of expertise whenever n2 < n0.
(i) Suppose n2 < n0 · n: Since n · n1; there exists a subgame-perfect e¢cient
equilibrium in which only TTO 1 invests in expertise and all …rms participate. This follows
from arguments similar to the ones made in the proof of the previous proposition. Suppose
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now that both TTOs invest in expertise. Since each TTO i employs the e¢cient strategy
¾i, and since n2 < n · n1 by hypothesis, it follows that for all …rms the probability of
getting a high quality invention from TTO 1 is higher than from TTO 2: This means that
these …rms will contract with TTO 2 only if it o¤ers a royalty rate that is low enough.
Since n2 < n0 there is a cuto¤ level of e¢ciency such that, for the …rms less e¢cient than
that cuto¤ TTO 2 can not o¤er a low enough royalty rate to induce their participation.
For …rms that are more e¢cient than the cuto¤ …rm such a royalty rate is strictly positive.
Thus, TTO 1 has incentive to slightly undercut TTO 2; and they will engage in Bertrand
type competition. In either case, TTO 2’s payo¤ is zero. Consequently, TTO 2 has no
incentive to invest in expertise in the …rst place, thus contradicting the hypothesis that
there is a subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibrium in which both TTOs invest in expertise.
Now, assume that there exists a subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibrium in which only
TTO 2 invests in expertise. Since TTO 2 employs the e¢cient strategy ¾2, and since
n2 < n, the candidate equilibrium involves non-participation by some …rms. Since n2 < n0;
by de…nition of n0, TTO 1 has an incentive to deviate by investing in expertise. This,
however, contradicts the hypothesis that there is another e¢cient equilibrium in which
only TTO 2 invests in expertise. The proof of statement 1 is hence complete.
(ii) The statement for the case of n0 · n2 < n follows straightforwardly from similar
arguments.
The analysis reveals that the market for university inventions tends to favor concen-
trated intermediation. Proposition 6 suggests that the identity of the active TTO is
uniquely determined when the di¤erences between the universities in terms of their in-
vention output is su¢ciently large. In this case the larger university will provide the
intermediation service for the economy. This may explain why some universities form re-
gional networks and share a common TTO, such as for example Access Technology Across
Indiana (ATAIN), a statewide alliance by universities in Indiana, including Indiana State
University, Indiana University, and Purdue University.
On the other hand, the proposition also shows that intermediation by the TTOwith the
smaller invention pool and non-participation by some …rms may be a possible equilibrium
outcome whenever the di¤erence in invention pools is not large enough. There is hence
the possibility of a welfare loss.
4.2 Specialization equilibria
Specialization is often observed in markets with intermediaries. Sometimes specialization
involves the investment in di¤erent kinds of expertise. For example, one TTO may special-
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ize in biotechnology, whereas another one may specialize in communication technology. On
the other hand, we show here that this is not necessarily the case, and specialization may
be just an equilibrium phenomenon where each TTO commits to license to an arbitrary
but di¤erent group of …rms. That is, specialization may arise even if “true” specialization
in terms of acquiring an expertise for certain …elds of technology is not possible.
Consider a partition of …rms into two sets, G1 and G2 with G1\G2 = ;; and G1[G2 =
K: That is, the groups of …rms are disjoint sets and each …rm is a member of one or the
other group, e.g., G1 includes all odd-numbered …rms and G2 all even-numbered …rms.
We denote the cardinality of G1 and G2 by #G1 and #G2; respectively. Let G1 be TTO
1’s priority group, and G2 that of the other TTO. We make use of the following de…nition.
For each G µ K; de…ne Gm to be the set of the m most e¢cient …rms in G: (If m > #G;
then Gm = G:)
De…nition 3 The specialization strategy of TTO i; i = 1; 2; is a strategy ¾i such that
(i) sj (mi) = 1 for each j 2 Gmii , and (ii) and sj (mi) = 1 for each j 2 G(mi¡#Gi)3¡i if
mi > #Gi:
Note that in the specialization equilibrium each TTO assigns as many high-quality
inventions as possible to the most e¢cient …rms in its own priority group, and if there
are more high-quality inventions than …rms in that group, it assigns each remaining high-
quality invention to the most e¢cient …rms in the other TTO’s priority group.
We now show that the model admits a subgame-perfect specialization equilibrium.
This equilibrium is supported by compatible …rm beliefs. That is, each …rm believes that
allocating the available high-quality inventions to …rms j 2 Gi; Gi ½ K; is a priority for
TTO i. To ensure the existence of the equilibrium, we make the following restrictions
on the size of each TTO’s invention pool. First, assume that ni ¸ n^Gi ; where n^Gi is the
size of the invention pool that is necessary to make participation pro…table for the most
e¢cient …rm j 2 Gi in the e¢cient equilibrium of the monopoly game when this …rm for
sure gets the good invention from TTO i if there is one, i = 1; 2:16 Second, let nGi be the
in…mum of ni such that the most e¢cient …rm in KnGi is left with non-negative surplus
in the specialization equilibrium. Assume that ni < nGi ; i = 1; 2.
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16 If the invention pool is smaller, it can not be pro…table for any …rm j 2 Gi to obtain a license from
TTO i under the specialization strategy.
17The upper bound on ni is due to the fact that if ni gets larger the probability that …rms of the non-
priority group obtain a high-quality invention gets larger. Hence, for large enough ni the specialization
strategy coincides with the e¢cient strategy. We use nGi to simplify matters.
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Proposition 7 Suppose n^Gi · ni < nGi ; i = 1; 2: There exists a subgame-perfect special-
ization equilibrium with a unique k^i · #Gi such that each …rm j 2 Gk^ii licenses from TTO
i if C is not too high.
Proof. Consider the continuation game where both TTOs have invested in expertise. If
…rms’ beliefs are compatible, it is easy to check that the described equilibrium involves a
set of licensing contracts that satisfy³
1¡ ½ij
´
¯j
h
~¼ijVH +
³
1¡ ~¼ij
´
VL
i
¡A = 0
for any …rm j 2 Gk^ii ; i = 1; 2: To see this, note that since ni < nGi ; i = 1; 2; each …rm
j 2 Gi believes that the probability that it obtains a high-quality invention from TTO ¡i
is too low to make licensing from ¡i pro…table for any ½¡ij . That is, faced with a contract
o¤er from each TTO, a …rm j 2 Gi always prefers a license from i over a license from ¡i.
There is hence no pro…table deviation for any TTO by choosing a di¤erent royalty rate,
given the other TTO’s selection strategy and compatible …rm beliefs.
We will now check whether any TTO can gain by deviating from both, its selection
strategy and royalty choice. Let j0 be the least e¢cient …rm j 2 Gi that obtains a high-
quality invention from TTO i in the candidate equilibrium. Clearly, the best possible
deviation consists of a reallocation of a high-quality invention from j0 to a …rm j00 2 G3¡i
with j00 < j0; i.e. a …rm of the rival TTO’s priority group that is more e¢cient that j0.
Since ni < nGi , however, there exists no contract ½
i
j00 that would induce …rm j
00 to license
from TTO i given sceptical belief against i: To see this, note that the described deviation
does not change the …rm’s belief and therefore its participation decision as …rms are unable
to observe the TTO’s selection strategy. That is, …rm j00 expects to obtain a low-quality
invention from TTO i with such a high probability that licensing from i is not pro…table
for that …rm. Clearly, the same argument holds for any …rm j 2 G3¡i. Hence the TTO
cannot gain by deviating from the specialization strategy.
We have thus shown that the specialization strategies are best responses to each other
and constitute an equilibrium in the innovation game that follows each TTO’s invest-
ment in expertise. Clearly, it is required that C must not be too large for the expertise
investment to be pro…table for each TTO. The proof is complete.
The result demonstrates that specialization to certain target groups can emerge in a
competitive market for university inventions. The basic features which lead to specializa-
tion are the possibility to partition the set of …rms in di¤erent subsets, an intermediate-
sized invention pool of each university, and su¢ciently low costs of expertise. Under these
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circumstances the TTOs can avoid Bertrand competition in the contract stage. This al-
lows them to recoup the cost of expertise up to a certain level, despite the presence of an
active rival.
What are the welfare consequences of specialization? Our analysis has revealed that
specialization may cause a waste of high-quality inventions ex post if mi > #Gi and
m3¡i < #G3¡i, i.e. if for one TTO the number of high-quality inventions exceeds the
number of …rms in its priority group, and vice versa for the other TTO. Given pessimistic
beliefs of …rms in the rival TTO’s priority group, a TTO will not be able to match them
with its remaining (mi ¡#Gi) high-quality inventions. That is, the social gains from
innovation may not be maximized ex post in the specialization equilibrium. Moreover, it is
worth noting that specialization involves investments by two TTOs where one investment
would have been su¢cient to solve the problem of uncertainty for the economy if the
investor had access to both invention pools. Combining TTO services may therefore be a
way to improve social welfare.
5 Intermediation with inventor involvement
The above analysis abstracts from the inventors’ role in the innovation process by treating
the probability that an invention is of high quality as exogenous. In this section we
endogenize this probability by assuming that it depends on the inventor’s development
e¤ort and giving each inventor the choice of whether to expend such e¤ort or not. We
thus essentially combine our model of Section 2 with that of Jensen and Thursby (2001).
We rede…ne the probability that an invention is of high quality as pi for invention
i. Following Jensen and Thursby, we assume that the probability of success depends on
the inventor’s development e¤ort, which is not contractible. We make the simplifying
assumption that pi = p if inventor i invests E > 0; and pi = 0 otherwise, where p 2 (0; 1] :
Furthermore, we replace the assumption on the cost of expertise accordingly by assuming
that
kX
j=1
¯jVH ¡ k (A+E) > C: (A3’)
The sequence of decisions in the extended framework is as follows. The investment
decision by the TTO at date 0 remains as before. At date 1, the TTO o¤ers each …rm j a
licensing contract for an invention i. The contract now speci…es the royalties for the TTO
and inventor i, denoted by ½Tij 2 (0; 1] and ½iij 2 (0; 1] ; respectively, with ½Tij + ½iij · 1: At
date 2, …rm j accepts or rejects the contract. If it accepts, a development stage follows
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at date 3 in which the inventor i can choose to increase the probability of success by
expending e¤orts in the development of his invention. Since e¤orts are non-contractible,
there is a moral hazard problem with respect to the inventor’s e¤ort, exactly as in the
model of Jensen and Thursby. Finally, the outcome of the inventor’s development e¤ort is
observed and the licensee-…rm decides whether to invest A for the implementation of the
new technology.
Denote the set of participating inventors by Q µ f1; :::; kg : The expected payo¤ of a
…rm j 2 P is ³
1¡ ½iij ¡ ½Tij
´
¯j [~¼jVH + (1¡ ~¼j)VL]¡A;
the expected payo¤ of inventor i 2 Q is
½iij¯j [~¼jVH + (1¡ ~¼j)VL]¡E;
and the expected payo¤ of the TTO is18X
j2 ~P
½Tij¯j [¼jVH + (1¡ ¼j)VL]¡C
if it invests in expertise.
Inventors and …rms will participate whenever they obtain a non-negative payo¤. It is
not di¢cult to check that in equilibrium the TTO sets the royalty rates ½iij and ½
T
ij such
that inventors and …rms choose to participate and are left with zero surplus. Hence, as in
Jensen and Thursby (2001), an inventor will be motivated to engage in the development
of the new technology by tying his payo¤ to that of the licensee-…rm. Apart from this, the
analysis of the extended game is qualitatively the same as that in Section 3. Moreover,
note that an incentive contract could in principle be directly signed between the inventor
and the licensee-…rm, once a match is made. This suggest that, despite the moral hazard
problem with inventor e¤ort, the intermediary’s e¤orts in locating pro…table inventions
and matching them with potential licensees may be a crucial element of e¤ective technology
transfer.
18 In Jensen and Thursby (2001) the TTO maximizes a weighted average of the expected payo¤s accruing
to the university administration and to the inventor. Since both parties are assumed to bene…t from a
higher license revenue, one can verify that their main results continue to hold if one assumes that the TTO
acts only on behalf of the university, as in our model, and ensures inventor participation via an optimal
incentive contract.
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6 Concluding remarks
Summary The paper o¤ers a new theoretical framework to investigate the organiza-
tion of innovation investments. Our main …nding is that intermediaries can play a crucial
role in forming the market for inventions by providing an opportunity to economize on
a critical component of innovation decisions under uncertainty: the expertise to locate
new inventions and evaluate their commercial value. Using a model of university-industry
technology transfer, we have identi…ed conditions under which in equilibrium intermedi-
ation in innovation becomes viable: …rst, success-based compensation schemes must be
feasible, and second, the size of the invention pool must be su¢ciently large, suggesting
the presence of economies of scale.
While we have demonstrated that intermediation can reduce and eliminate the uncer-
tainty problems in the relation between creators and users of new inventions, the study
also identi…es limitations to the potential e¢ciency of intermediation activity. First, the
intermediary’s selection incentives in the market for inventions need not be fully aligned
with society’s interest. Second, the intermediaries incentive to invest in expertise strongly
depends upon the investors’ beliefs about the intermediaries selection strategy, introducing
a high potential of coordination failure. Indeed, no investment in expertise and no inno-
vation is always an equilibrium of our model. Third, competition between intermediaries
may be an additional source of ine¢ciency. In particular, the identity of the active inter-
mediary may not be optimal from a welfare point of view as well as the market division
in the case of specialized intermediaries.
Empirical evidence The …ndings are supported by empirical evidence. In the context
of university-industry technology transfer, Hsu and Bernstein’s (1997) case studies suggest
that a critical mass of university research activity is often required before a university
technology transfer o¢ce (TTO) can become active. Using an econometric model, Siegel et
al. (2000) estimate the impact of the number of disclosed inventions on the license revenue
of TTOs and …nd strong evidence of increasing returns to scale, which is consistent with
our model. In their extensive …eld research on organizational practices of university TTOs,
Siegel et al. …nd that …rms often view the skills and expertise of TTO sta¤ as critical to
the e¤ectiveness of university-industry technology transfer. Nevertheless, they also …nd
that some TTOs appear to have little incentives to invest in expertise. Our results may
provide a possible explanation for this observation: universities may not have a pool of
commercializable technologies large enough to make such an investment attractive.
Of course, there are also cases where …rms receive information about the existence
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and value of university inventions from other sources, making intermediation activity less
relevant. Audretsch and Stephan (1996) and Zucker et al. (1998), for example, …nd
evidence that the personal characteristics of the inventors, such as the status of being a
“star” scientists as measured in terms of research productivity or the receipt of a Nobel
prize, can play an important role in attracting …rms of the biotechnology industry. On
the other hand, such cases appear to be a “right-tail of the distribution” phenomenon,
which primarily happens at the very best universities with top scientists in each …eld. The
model developed in this paper thus seems best applicable to “representative” universities
and scientists.
Policy relevance The approach developed in this paper may help to understand the ef-
fects of a recent regulatory change related to government-sponsored research in the United
States, the Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Amendments Act of 1980,19 and frame cur-
rent government initiatives aimed at copying the Bayh-Dole Act in Germany and Japan.20
The Act gave universities the right to retain title to and license inventions resulting from
federally funded research and permitted exclusive licensing between universities and in-
dustrial …rms for these inventions. Since the passage of the Act, an increasing number of
U.S. universities began to establish TTOs, and the number of academic licenses increased
signi…cantly.21 As the analysis in this paper suggests, TTOs can play a crucial role in
forming a market for university inventions, provided they obtain su¢cient royalty revenue
to recoup the investment in expertise. Clearly, the feasibility of running royalties depends
on whether universities hold the property rights and are able to license faculty inventions
on an exclusive basis.22 Thus, e¤ective TTO intermediation appears to became a viable
option for universities only after the regulatory changes.
Future research The analysis and results of the paper seem to carry over to the con-
text of underwriters and technology-based business incubators who intermediate between
19For a discussion of the policy debates on the Bayh-Dole Act and a survey over the related empirical
and theoretical literature, see Ja¤e (2000).
20See, e.g., Süddeutsche Zeitung, “Hochschulen sollen Er…ndungen vermarkten”, October 27, 2000; The
Economist, “The land of disappointments”, March 04, 2000.
21According to the recent licensing survey by the Association of University Technology Managers
(AUTM), AUTM membership increased from 100 TTOs in 1980 to more than 2100 in 1999, and the
number of academic licenses increased by 133% over the period from 1991 to 1999. See the AUTM Web
Page, http://www.autm.net.
22Without exclusive rights, a …rm’s incentive to commercialize a new technology tends to be considerably
reduced by the possibility of free rider e¤ects (cf. Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Buchanan and Yoon, 2000).
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new start-up …rms and potential investors, trying to convince a particular investor that
a particular start-up …rm is pro…table. Venture capitalists di¤er crucially from TTOs,
underwriters, and incubators in that they raise money in advance, promising potential in-
vestors to reinvest the money in pro…table projects on their behalf. Thus, addressing this
form of intermediation would require a modi…cation of our model by considering selection
rules that do not depend on the identity of a particular investor and particular invention
or project. Nonetheless, we expect the main conclusions of the paper to hold in such a
context.
The model could be usefully extended to analyze the e¤ects of intermediation on the
interplay between the investor’s incentives to commercialize inventions and the inventor’s
incentives to generate new inventions. It seems also worth exploring specialization incen-
tives of competing intermediaries in a model where inventions di¤er with respect to their
commercial value. For example, the average invention from the medical school may have
a larger commercial value than the average invention from, say, the physics department.
In the context of university-industry technology transfer, a related potential extension of
the model would include competition between universities for talented faculty.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that the timing and nature of innovation are
fundamental issues in the understanding of economic growth. Hence, results which draw
on a careful analysis of intermediation in innovation may provide signi…cant implications
for policies on economic growth.
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